A federal judge has granted a preliminary stay blocking U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement policies that prevented members of Congress from conducting unannounced visits to immigration detention facilities, ruling that the restrictions violate federal law that guarantees congressional oversight access.

U.S. District Judge Jia M. Cobb issued a memorandum opinion on December 17 in the case Neguse v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, finding that twelve Democratic members of Congress are substantially likely to succeed in their challenge to two ICE policies implemented in June 2025.

The lawsuit targeted what the court referred to as ICE’s “Oversight Visit Policies,” which consisted of two restrictions implemented during a period of expanded immigration enforcement under the Trump administration.​

First, ICE instituted a requirement that all members of Congress provide seven calendar days advance notice before visiting ICE detention facilities. The policy, posted to ICE’s Office of Congressional Relations webpage in mid-June 2025, remains in effect.​

Second, ICE adopted a policy categorically excluding field offices from congressional oversight requirements. A guidance document briefly posted to ICE’s website stated that “ICE Field Offices are not detention facilities and fall outside of the Sec. 527 requirements” because they are “working offices where Enforcement and Removal Operations personnel process aliens to make custody determinations based on the specific circumstances of each case.” While ICE removed this document from its website, evidence showed officials continued enforcing the policy to deny access to field offices.

The twelve plaintiff representatives—Joe Neguse, Adriano Espaillat, Bennie G. Thompson, Jamie Raskin, Robert Garcia, J. Luis Correa, Jason Crow, Veronica Escobar, Daniel S. Goldman, Jimmy Gomez, Raul Ruiz, and Norma Torres—all attempted to visit various ICE facilities without advance notice and were denied entry under one of the challenged policies.​

The lawmakers argued the restrictions prevented them from conducting oversight at a time when the Trump administration has dramatically expanded immigration detention. According to DHS officials, the agency has “turbocharged the arrest and deportation of illegal aliens,” leading to what plaintiffs alleged were record numbers of people being held in immigration detention.​

Representatives described concerns about detention conditions based on news reports, constituent outreach, and reports of poor conditions and mistreatment. They emphasized the importance of unannounced visits to their duties in drafting legislation, serving constituents, and conducting oversight, noting that advance notice gives ICE time to “obscure the true conditions at a given facility.”

The lawsuit centered on Section 527, an appropriations rider that has appeared in every Department of Homeland Security funding bill since fiscal year 2020. The provision prohibits DHS from using appropriated funds “to prevent any Member of Congress from entering, for the purpose of conducting oversight, any facility operated by or for the Department of Homeland Security used to detain or otherwise house aliens.”

Section 527 also prohibits using funds “to make any temporary modification at any such facility that in any way alters what is observed by a visiting Member of Congress” compared to what would be observed without such modification. Critically, the statute states that “nothing in this section may be construed to require a Member of Congress to provide prior notice of the intent to enter a facility” for oversight purposes.​

The statute does allow DHS to require 24 hours advance notice for visits by congressional staff members, but contains no similar provision for members of Congress themselves.​

Judge Cobb found that plaintiffs satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary stay under the Administrative Procedure Act: substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, no substantial injury to other parties, and furtherance of the public interest.​

Standing and Jurisdiction

The court first addressed whether individual members of Congress had legal standing to sue, applying the framework from Raines v. Byrd, which generally bars legislators from suing to vindicate institutional injuries to Congress as a whole. Judge Cobb distinguished this case, finding the lawmakers alleged concrete, particularized injuries personal to them as individuals.​

The court identified two theories of injury. First, denial of physical access to facilities to which plaintiffs claim a statutory right of entry constitutes a “tangible harm” and “concrete injury in fact.” Each plaintiff sought to visit different facilities at different times for different reasons, making the injury particularized rather than abstract.​

Second, the denial of on-the-ground information about detention conditions constitutes an informational injury. The court found Section 527 functions similarly to public disclosure statutes, creating an entitlement to information by requiring facilities to admit members and prohibiting temporary modifications that would alter what they observe.​

Merits of the Seven-Day Notice Requirement

On the merits, Judge Cobb found the seven-day notice requirement clearly violates Section 527. The court rejected the government’s argument that a delayed entry is not a prevented entry, noting that “prevent” means “to keep from happening” or “to hold or keep back, hinder, stop.”

The notice requirement directly contradicts Section 527(b), which states that nothing in the section “may be construed to require a Member of Congress to provide prior notice” of intent to enter a covered facility. Additionally, Section 527(c) specifically authorizes DHS to require 24 hours notice for congressional staff visits, but says nothing about members themselves—indicating that advance notice requirements are not permissible for members of Congress.​

The court also rejected government arguments that other statutory authorities, such as the DHS Secretary’s responsibility for arranging detention places, could justify the notice requirement. “What Congress giveth, Congress may taketh away,” Judge Cobb wrote, noting that these general, prior-in-time statutes cannot overcome the specific prohibition in the later-passed Section 527.​

Field Office Exclusion Policy

Judge Cobb also found plaintiffs likely to succeed on their challenge to the categorical exclusion of field offices from Section 527 coverage. Despite the government’s denials that such a policy exists, the court found evidence that ICE officials consistently cited this rationale when denying access to field offices, and that DHS Secretary Kristi Noem reiterated the position in an August 2025 letter to Representative Garcia.​

On the merits, the court found that certain ICE field offices clearly fall within Section 527’s scope as facilities “used to detain or otherwise house aliens.” ICE’s own internal regulations permit “holding facilities” within field offices for “short-term confinement of individuals who have recently been detained”—defined as periods not exceeding 12 hours absent exceptional circumstances.​

Evidence showed that individuals are in practice held at field offices for far longer. Representatives were told that processing at the Los Angeles field office “may take up to 72 hours,” and one individual reported being detained at the New York Field Office for four days. Officials also confirmed that field offices have holding areas where people “are detained and not allowed to leave.”

The court found that Section 527 applies to “any facility” used to detain noncitizens, with the term “any” having an “expansive meaning.” The definition depends not on how DHS labels a facility, but on “how it is employed in practice.”

Irreparable Harm and Public Interest

Judge Cobb found that plaintiffs face irreparable harm absent relief because the information they seek is “time-sensitive” and conditions in detention facilities “can change rapidly, rendering a week too long to wait for that information.” The court rejected the government’s argument that improved conditions would eliminate the harm, noting that the ability to observe actual conditions—not sanitized versions—is precisely what Section 527 protects.​

The public interest strongly favors granting relief, the court found, because “there is little public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” The case involves violation of an appropriations statute, and “the public has an interest in ensuring that statutes enacted by their representatives are not imperiled by executive fiat.”

The court granted a stay of both challenged policies under Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act, pending conclusion of the review proceedings. This means the seven-day notice requirement and the categorical field office exclusion policy cannot be enforced while the case continues.​

Judge Cobb rejected the government’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc. prohibits such a stay, noting that “CASA is not a case about the scope of relief for agency review authorized by the APA.”

The Department of Homeland Security and ICE have not yet indicated whether they will appeal the ruling or how they will implement the stay of the challenged policies.